Promulgating Requirements for Admission to Prosecute Patent Applications by Burke, MIchelle J. & Field, Thomas G., Jr
University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Law Faculty Scholarship University of New Hampshire – School of Law
7-1-1997




Thomas G. Field Jr
Franklin Pierce Law Center
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Burke, MIchelle J. and Field, Thomas G. Jr, "Promulgating Requirements for Admission to Prosecute Patent Applications" (1997). Law
Faculty Scholarship. 423.
https://scholars.unh.edu/law_facpub/423
PTO Patent Bar Examination
Home > PTO Patent Bar Examination
Current Students Prospective Students Alumni Faculty Contact Us     
l     Thomas G. 
Field, Jr.
l     Professor 
Field's Home 
Page
l     Courses
l     IP at Pierce 
Law
l     IP Basics
 
Promulgating Requirements for Admission 
to Prosecute Patent Applications* 
 
 
Michelle J. Burke & Thomas G. Field, Jr.** 
 
Contents
l     Introduction 
Notes 
l     The Evolution of PTO Power to Restrict Admission 
Notes 
l     PTO Requirements under 35 U.S.C. 31 
l     Notes 
l     APA Rule Making and Its Exceptions 
Notes 
l     Conclusion: PTO Requirements Should not be Regarded as Law until Properly 
Promulgated 
Notes 
l     Appendix 
 
I. Introduction
Among federal agencies, the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office 2 is unique in its 
ability to require attorneys to submit to special requirements, such as passing a six hour 
examination, before being permitted to practice before it in patent cases. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has held that an individual so admitted to practice before the PTO need 
not comply with state requirements otherwise applicable to those practicing law. 
The first part of this article discusses how this requirement came to be. It then 
discusses how the PTO determines whether an individual is fit to sit for the patent 
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examination, focusing particularly on provisions contained in a bulletin mailed by its 
Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED) to all would-be patent practitioners [A 
more recent version of the OED General Requirements Bulletin is now online]. It also 
briefly discusses rule-making requirements (and exceptions) generally applicable to 
federal agencies and examines the nature of the aforesaid provisions intended to affect 
admission to prosecute patent applications. This article concludes that the detailed 
provisions sent to applicants, fitting none of the rule-making exceptions, should be 
promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. It also concludes 
that, in the meantime, those provisions should not be regarded as binding on applicants 
to practice before the PTO in patent cases. Finally, the article contains an appendix that 






 From 36 Idea 145 (1995). After this paper was written, the D.C. District Court and 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected arguments of a pro se applicant that 
the PTO should be obligated to use notice and comment rulemaking (as argued at the 
end of this paper) to promulgate requirements for those wishing to sit for the patent 
exam. Those cases are discussed in a short comment that is also online. 
Readers interested in the notes should recall that Netscape permits more than one open 
window. Thus, anyone who wants convenient access can arrange two windows to view 
text and corresponding notes simultaneously. This makes a lot more sense than some 
of the alternatives, e.g., individual links between text and notes. 
**Ms. Burke practices intellectual property law with Foster-Miller in Waltham, MA. 
She received her B.S. in Biotechnology (with Distinction) from Worcester Polytechnic 
Institute and her J.D. and Master of Intellectual Property degrees from Franklin Pierce 
Law Center. Mr. Field is Professor of Law at Franklin Pierce Law Center. A registered 
patent attorney and former patent examiner, he received his A.B. (Chemistry) and J.D. 
from West Virginia University and an LL.M (Trade Regulation) from New York 
University. The authors appreciate helpful observations from Adam Solomon, a J.D. 
candidate and Professor William O. Hennessey, Director of Graduate Programs at 
Franklin Pierce Law Center. 
2.
 Hereafter PTO or Office. Not until 1975, was the name changed from Patent Office 
to Patent and Trademark Office, P.L. 93-596 (1975). 
Contents 
II.The Evolution of PTO Power to Restrict Admission
Sperry v. Florida 3 is probably the most important case to affect those who prosecute 
patent applications on behalf of others. There, the U. S. Supreme Court held that a 
person admitted to practice before the Office could not be denied that right by states 
regulating the practice of law.4 Indeed, had the case gone the other way, anyone 
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prosecuting patents other than as paralegals, i.e., as independent patent agents, and not 
admitted to practice law 5 in a particular state, would have been put out of business.6 
Most states do not permit anyone to sit for a bar examination without having first 
graduated from a law school approved by the American Bar Association.7 
As discussed in Sperry, anyone apparently could prosecute patent applications on 
behalf of others until 1869.8 As early as 1848, it was appreciated that, in line with then-
prevailing attitudes toward the practice of law,9 or consumer protection generally,10 
little stood in the way of those who victimized inventors.11 In 1861, Congress first 
provided that, for gross misconduct, the Commissioner could refuse to recognize any 
person, either generally or in a particular case. In 1869, the Office provided that "[a]ny 
person of intelligence and good moral character may appear...... upon filing proper 
power of attorney."12 
Sperry relates:13 
To remedy these abuses, the Commissioner... in 1899 first required 
registration of persons practicing before the Patent Office and in 1918, 
required practitioners to obtain prior approval of all advertising material 
which they distributed. It was to reach these same evils that [Sec.] 31 
was given much its present form when, in 1922, the statute was amended 
to expressedly authorize the Commissioner to prescribe regulations for 
the recognition of agents and attorneys. [Notes omitted.]
Of interest is the Court's discussion of proposals, dating at least as early as 1912, to 
restrict patent prosecution to lawyers and the rejection of such proposals by the 
Office.14 Moreover, the Court goes on to discuss initiatives, beginning with general 
1940s administrative procedure reform, to preclude non-lawyers from practicing before 
"some 40-odd federal administrative agencies, including the Patent Office."15 
Indeed, the Court states:16 
So successful have the efforts of the Patent Office been that the Office 
was able to inform the Hoover Commission that "there is no significant 
difference between lawyers and non-lawyers either with respect to their 
ability to handle the work or with respect to their ethical conduct." [Note 
omitted.]
However, in the same vein, the Administrative Conference reports:17 
In 1957 the Department of Justice recommended discontinuing the 
practice of many agencies whereby attorneys were required to apply for 
acceptance by the agency as practitioners. Several bills were introduced 
in the early 1960s to abolish agency admission requirements, and only 
the Treasury Department and the Patent Office objected to discontinuing 
them.
Little more than two years after Sperry, Congress enacted the Agency Practice Act. It 
provides: "An individual who is a member in good standing of the bar of the highest 
court of any state may represent a person before an agency on filing ... a written 
declaration .... "18 Also, that statute explicitly does not "grant nor deny an individual 
[not so qualified] the right to appear ...."19 or "authorize or limit the discipline, 
including disbarment, of individuals who appear .... "20 Finally, it provides that most 
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21 of the section does not apply "to practice before the Patent Office with respect to 
patent matters that continue to be covered by [35 U.S.C. Secs. 31-33]."22 Thus, the 
PTO is unique in its ability to significantly hinder lawyers from representing others in 
matters pending before it. Moreover, aside from the situation of appearances by CPAs 
before the Internal Revenue Service,23 the PTO is unique in its explicit power to 
permit non-lawyers to practice before it as held in Sperry, notwithstanding the 
objection of any state concerning the unauthorized practice of law. 
Contents 
Skip notes 
Notes for the Evolution of PTO Power
 
3.
 373 U.S. 379 (1963). 
4.
 Sperry is also apparently the first case to find state authority over patents and related 
matters to be preempted by federal law. See Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.
S. 225, 229 (1964) - many regard Sears, itself, as the first such case. 
5.
 "We do not question the determination that under Florida law the preparation and 
prosecution of patent applications for others constitutes the practice of law .... " Sperry, 
373 U.S. at 383. 
6.
 It is rumored, but we were unable to confirm except at one firm, that such persons 
cannot obtain malpractice insurance. If so, that would seem indirectly to accomplish 
much the same result. 
7.
 See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION, LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AN EDUCATIONAL 
CONTINUUM, 100 (Robert McCrate ed., Student Edition 1992). 
8.
 373 U.S. 379, 388 (1963). 
9.
 Supra note 6, at 95-7. 
10.
 E.g., selling quack medicines was not federally prohibited until 1912, with passage 
of the Shirley Amendment, 37 Stat. 416. 
11.
 Despite the early recognition of nonlawyers by the Patent Office, these agents, not 
subject to the professional restraints of their lawyer brethren, were particularly 
responsible for the deceptive advertising and victimization of inventors which long 
plagued the Patent Office. Sperry, 373 U.S., at 390. But see, supra note 6, at 95-7 
(according to the McCrate Report, there seems to be little basis for distinguishing 
lawyers and nonlawyers prior the 1880s). While some progress may have made with 
regard to patent prosecutors in the intervening years, inventors are still very much at 
risk from fraudulent invention promoters. The extent of such fraud recently prompted 
the Federal Trade Commission to publish a small pamphlet entitled, Facts for 
Consumers: Invention Promotion Firms (Jan. 1994). It has also prompted hearings in 
the U.S. Senate on September 1, 1994. and subsequent introduction ofS. 909, 1o4th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (intended to become the Inventor Protection Act of 1995). 
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12.
 Sec. 127 Rules and Directions for Proceedings in the Patent Office (1969). See 
Sperry, 373 U.S. at 388. 
13.
 373 U.S. at 390. 
14.
 373 U.S. at 391-6. 
15.
 373 U.S. at 396-402. 
16.
 373 U.S. at 402 (note omitted). 
17.
 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 266 (2d ed. 1992). 
18.
 5 U.S.C. Sec. 500(b), P. L. 89-332, 79 Stat. 1281 (1965); incorporated into the U.S. 
Code with minor stylistic changes by P.L. 90-83, 81 Stat. 195 (1967). 
19.
 5 U.S.C. Sec. 500(d)(1) (1977). 
20.
 5 U.S.C. Sec. 500(d)(2) (1977). 
21.
 5 U.S.C. Sec. 500 (1977). Only subsection f appears to apply (indicating that notice 
to a participant may be sent to his or her representative). 
22.
 5 U.S.C. Sec. 500(e) (1977). 
Contents 
III. PTO Requirements under 35 U.S.C. 31
Title 35, section 31 (Regulations for agents and attorneys) of the U.S. Code provides: 
The Commissioner, subject to the approval of the Secretary of 
Commerce, may prescribe regulations governing the recognition and 
conduct of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or 
other parties before the Patent and Trademark Office, and may require 
them, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other 
persons, to show that they are of good moral character and reputation 
and are possessed of the necessary qualifications to render to applicants 
or other persons valuable service, advice, and assistance in the 
presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before 
the Office. [Emphasis added.]
Regulations under that provision were moved to new Part 10 of 37 C.F.R. in 1985. 
Recognizing limitations on PTO power, Sec. 10.14 provides that "any individual who 
is an attorney may represent others before the Office in trademark and other non-patent 
cases." However, it is generally necessary 24 for anyone wanting to prosecute patent 
cases to:25 apply, in writing; establish that he or she is of good moral character, 
"possessed of the legal, scientific, and technical qualifications necessary to enable him 
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or her to render applicants for patent valuable service;"26 and pass an examination that 
is not "administered as a mere academic exercise."27 Practice without so qualifying 
subjects one to fines of "not more than $1000 for each such offense."28 
The PTO elaborates at length in a "General Requirements Bulletin" (Bulletin) 
furnished to those who inquire about admission.29 Upon receiving it, many would-be 
practitioners find their most difficult hurdle, aside from passing the patent exam, to be 
proving sufficient technical qualifications to be permitted to sit for the exam. 
As provided in the Bulletin, technical qualifications can be established in only three 
basic ways.30 First, an applicant can show a bachelor's degree (or equivalent) in one of 
twenty-nine specific technical subjects.31 Second, if the applicant's degree is not listed, 
he or she may establish "scientific and technical training equivalent to that received for 
a bachelor's degree in one of the subjects listed" by showing a specified number of 
semester hours in physics, chemistry, engineering or biological sciences.32 This may 
be accomplished with an official undergraduate transcript and official descriptions for 
each course potentially credited or through proof of an apprenticeship with a registered 
patent attorney or agent.33 Finally, an applicant may demonstrate sufficient technical 
training by taking and passing the Engineer-in-Training test.34 
The Office amends the Bulletin from time to time.35 For example, one author of this 
article (Field) recalls that, prior to Chakrabarty,36 biology was not an accepted degree, 
and courses in biology were not recognized. This caused substantial difficulty for some 
Franklin Pierce Law Center students who had otherwise demonstrated ample capacity 
to prosecute patent applications. More recently, students with computer science, in 
contrast with computer engineering, degrees have faced difficulty.37 Again, Field is 
aware of highly capable individuals who were not permitted to sit. In one instance, an 
applicant's school had changed the name of its degree from computer science to 
computer engineering after he had received it (but would not issue him a new 
diploma). Moreover, that person had already been hired by a very prestigious patent 
firm. Yet, the PTO required him to take additional courses before being permitted to sit 
for the exam. 
One of the more interesting things about the Bulletin is that it was promulgated, and is 
regularly revised, without opportunity for those outside the PTO to comment, or at 
least formally.38 However, the PTO, and heretofore the courts,39 seem to regard its 
contents as carrying as much legal authority as 37 C.F.R. or even the patent statute 
itself.40 The following discussion questions the propriety of that approach. 
Contents 
Skip notes 
Notes for PTO Requirements
 
23.
 5 U.S.C. Sec. 500(c) (1977). 
24.
 37 C.F.R. Sec. 10.9 (1994) permits recognition in a particular case upon a showing 
that it is necessary or justifiable. 
25.
 This summarizes 37 C.F.R. Sec. 10.7 (1994). 
26.
 37 C.F.R. Sec. 10.7 (b) (1994) (emphasis added); compare italicized language in 35 
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U.S.C. Sec. 31, supra. 
27.
 37 C.F.R. Sec. 10.7 (b) (1994). Subsection b also provides that the exam may be 
waived for those who served at least four years as a patent examiner. See, e.g., Leeds v. 
Mosbacher, 732 F.Supp. 198 (D.D.C. 1990). 
28.
 35 U.S.C. Sec. 33 (1994). 
29.
 The Bulletin distributed in advance of the April 1992 exam, had a cover bearing a 
much longer title: General Requirements for Admission to the Examination for 
Registration to Practice in Patent Cases before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
One recent Bulletin is very similar but lacks the cover bearing the longer title. 
30.
 Id. at 2. 
31.
 Id. The following are listed: biology, biochemistry, botany, electronics technology, 
aeronautical engineering, agricultural engineering, biomedical engineering, ceramic 
engineering, chemical (including electrochemical) engineering, civil engineering, 
computer engineering, electrical engineering, engineering physics, geological 
engineering, industrial engineering, mechanical engineering, metallurgical engineering, 
mining engineering, nuclear engineering, petroleum engineering, food technology, 
general chemistry, marine technology, microbiology, molecular biology, organic 
chemistry, pharmacology, physics, and textile technology. 
32.
 Id. Four options are listed: (1) 24 semester hours in physics, (2) a combination of 24 
semester hours in biological sciences and either 8 semester hours (two sequential 
semesters) of chemistry with a lab or 8 semester hours (two sequential semesters) of 
physics with a lab, (3) 30 semester hours in chemistry, or (4) a combination of 40 
semester hours of chemistry, physics, biological sciences, or engineering which 
includes at least 8 semester hours two sequential semesters) of chemistry with a lab, or 
8 semester hours (two sequential semesters) of physics with a lab. 
33.
 Id. at 3. 
34.
 Id. at 4. 
35.
 The discussion of the second option (supra note 31) is now longer than it was in 
April 1992. Also, it is interesting to compare the present and 1962 versions. The latter 
is quoted in part in Gager v. Ladd, 212 F.Supp. 671, 673 (D.D.C. 1963). 
36.
 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
37.




 See, e.g., Gager, supra note 34. 
40.
 See, e.g., In re Doe, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1934 (Comm'r 1993) (Decided Dec. 7, 1992; 
released June 10, 1993). 
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Contents 
IV. APA Rule Making and its Exceptions
 
Professor Kenneth C. Davis, long a, if not the, leading federal administrative process 
scholar, has called rule making under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 41 "one 
of the greatest inventions of modern government."42 Also, as discussed by Wamsley in 
his seminal article,43 the Office has long used rule making even when not required:44 
While most of the Patent and Trademark Office rules of practice may 
have been exempt from the APA rulemaking requirement under [an] 
exemption..., the Office chose to follow the requirements of APA Sec. 4 
for its rule making and has done so ever since.
The APA defines a rule as "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe 
law or policy or describing the organization, procedure or practice requirements of an 
agency .... "45 APA Sec. 4, now 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553, provides the primary process for 
making rules. This process is also known as "informal" or "notice and comment" rule 
making. Basically, Sec. 553 requires that before a rule can be effective, a proposal 
must be published in the Federal Register,46 an opportunity must be afforded for 
interested persons to participate and, after consideration of relevant matter so 
presented, adopted rules must incorporate a concise general statement of their basis and 
purpose.47 Finally, it provides that "[e]ach agency shall give an interested person the 
right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."48 
As suggested above, Sec. 553 contains exceptions. For present purposes, the most 
significant appears to be that "this subsection does not apply ...to interpretative rules, 
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice .... 
" These exceptions are construed narrowly,49 but the line between exempt and non-
exempt rules has been described as "blurred," "tenuous" and "fuzzy."50 Nevertheless, 
let's consider them in order. 
"Interpretative" rules are defined as "rules or statements issued by an agency to advise 
the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it 
administers."51 However, these interpretations cannot add substantive content to the 
authorizing legislation, even when the rule is "based on an agency's power to exercise 
its judgment as to how best to implement a general statutory mandate."52 Interpretive 
rules should not be binding on the public because they set forth only what the agency 
believes existing laws or regulations to mean. They should not impose new obligations, 
even if these obligations are designed to implement a statute.53 
General statements of policy are considered to be "statements issued by an agency to 
advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise 
a discretionary power."54 The statements are issued to indicate what course the agency 
intends to take in the future. This is done by "announc[ing] [the] motivating factors the 
agency will consider, or tentative goals toward which it will aim, in determining the 
resolution of a substantive question of regulation."55 These statements are not meant 
to impose any new rights or obligations on the regulated parties, but instead to allow 
the agency to explain its intended future actions.56 Thus, if the announcement states a 
change in substantive rights, it is not a general statement of policy. 
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Rules relating to agency organization, practice or procedure are "technical regulation
[s] in the form of agency action and proceedings [and] ...should not be deemed to 
include any action which goes beyond formality and substantially affects the rights of 
those over whom the agency exercises authority."57 The purpose of this exception was 
to provide agency latitude in the governing internal operations.58 A two-part test 
recently recommended by the Administrative Conference states that for a rule to fall 
under this exception, it should:59 
relate solely to agency methods of internal operations or of interacting 
with regulated parties or the public, and [should] not significantly affect 
conduct, activity, or a substantive interest that is the subject of agency 
jurisdiction, or affect the standards for eligibility for a government 
program.
Examples of non-exempt rules given by the Administrative Conference include criteria 
for determining the severity of enforcement sanctions or application requirements for 
benefits, contracts, licenses, permits and loan guarantees.60 
Also, an argument might be made that the word, "practice," in the Sec. 553 exception 
61 is a distinct basis for exclusion encompassing rules that govern, e.g., admission to 
"practice" law before administrative agencies, but it seems more likely that the word is 
used as in "practice and procedure." Indeed, in 37 C.F.R., practically all of the rules in 
patent and trademark cases are called rules of "practice!" 
Contents 
Skip notes 
Notes for APA Rule Making 
41.
 Primarily 5 U.S.C. Secs. 551-559, 701-706 (1977) originally enacted as P.L. 404, 
60 Stat. 237 (1946) and replaced by P.L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 237 (1966) as part of a 
general revision of Title 5. 
42.
 See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 142 (3d 
ed. 1972). 
43.
 Herbert C. Wamsley, The Rulemaking Power of the Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks, 64 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y, 490 (Part 1), 539 (Part 2) and 605 
(Part 3) (1982). 
44.
 Id. at 503-4. APA Sec. 4 is the same as 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553 (1977). 
45.
 5 U.S.C. Sec. 551 (1977). 
46.
 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553 (b) (1977). 
47.
 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553 (c) (1977). Once a rule is adopted, it should be possible for any 
interested person to challenge it, at least on process grounds -- an interested person 
being one who participated in the rulemaking proceeding; see, e.g., Gage v. AEC, 479 
F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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48.
 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553 (d) (1977). 
49.
 See, e.g., Air Transport Ass'n America v. Dep't Transp., 900 F.2d. 369, 375 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990), judgment vacated as moot, 111 S. Ct. 944 (1991). 
50.
 Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, 
and the Like - Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public? 41 DUKE L.J. 
1311, 1321 (1992). 
51.
 Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 30, n.3 (1947), 
reprinted in Sourcebook, supra note 16, at 96. See also, Robert A. Shwarts, 
Delineation in the Exceptions to the Notice Comment and Provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1069, 1073 (1989). 
52.
 Supra note 49, at 1313. 
53.
 See, e.g., American Hospital Ass'n v. Bowen, 640 F.Supp. 453, 460 (D.D.C. 1986). 
54.
 Supra note 50. 
55.
 Brown Express, Inc. v. U.S., 607 F.2d. 695, 701 (5th Cir. 1979). 
56.
 American Business Ass'n v. U.S., 627 F.2d. 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
57.
 Pickus v. U.S. Board of Parole, 507 F.2d. 1107, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
58.
 Air Transp. Ass'n America v. Dept. Transp., 900 F.2d. 369, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
59.
 Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Nancy G. Miller, The APA Procedural Rule Exemption: 





5 U.S.C. Sec. 553(b) (exception A) (1977). 
Contents 
V. Conclusion: PTO Requirements Should not be Regarded as Law until Properly 
Promulgated
 
Both the PTO and courts reviewing refusals to permit applicants to sit for the patent 
exam have treated the criteria set forth in the General Requirements Bulletin as though 
they were part of the statute. Thus, they have been clearly "determinative of the issues 
or rights addressed and foreclose[d] alternate courses of action or conclusively affect
[ed] rights of private parties."62 There is no doubt that they are intended to and have 
substantively bound many individuals.63 It was to prevent precisely this type of 
situation that led to inclusion of the rule-making provisions in the APA. 
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In that respect, the following is particularly instructive: 64 
As this court has previously stated, the Commission's "characterization 
of its statement as an exposition of its policy or interpretation of the 
standard does not preclude our finding that it is something more." Such a 
distinction between "interpretative rules" and "something more," i.e., 
"substantive" or "legislative" rules, is not always easily made. 
Nonetheless, courts are in general agreement that interpretative rules 
simply state what the administrative agency thinks the statute means, and 
only "remind" affected parties of existing duties. In contrast, a 
substantive or legislative rule, pursuant to properly delegated authority, 
has the force of law, and creates new law or imposes new rights or 
duties. 
The distinction between interpretative and legislative rules is significant 
because...the Administrative Procedure Act, exempts "interpretative 
rules . . . " from the process of notice and comment. Legislative rules 
which fail to satisfy such procedural requirements must be set aside. 
In deciding whether proposed Sec. 1501.20 is an interpretative rule, this 
court should consider the Commission's "intent in authoring it, as 
ascertained by an examination of the provision's language, its context, 
and any available extrinsic evidence." Here, the language of the 
statement and related comments establishes that more is involved than 
mere "interpretation," because the proposed statement has the clear 
intent of eliminating a former exemption and of providing the 
Commission with power to enforce violations of a new rule. For 
example, the statement gives the Commission authority to impose the 
full range of civil and criminal penalties provided by Congress .... For 
these reasons, the Commission's contention that the rule does not 
"command performance" is simply incredible. Its proposal that, instead, 
the statement "only expects" and "urges" compliance, and merely 
provides guidance to the public and its staff, ignores the statement's plain 
language.[Citations omitted.]
Thus, it is difficult to understand how the detailed, and ever more lengthy and 
specific,65 provisions in the Bulletin could be regarded as merely interpretations of 37 
C.R. Sec. 10.7 or ultimately 35 U.S.C. Sec. 31. Indeed, given the long-standing, 
generally favorable PTO attitude toward notice and comment rule making,66 it is 
difficult to imagine why the contents of its Bulletin were not long ago promulgated in 
accordance with the notice and comment rule-making provisions of the APA. The most 
likely explanation seems to be that the Office apparently has parallel requirements for 
examiners and attorneys or agents.67 While it need not seek public comment before 
establishing qualifications for examiners, qualifications for outsiders are another matter 
altogether.68 
As we see it, the situation is ripe for a rule-making petition under Sec. 553(d) if not an 
action to require rule making.69 Only general unfamiliarity with the APA among 
patent lawyers seems to explain why something along this line wasn't pursued long 
ago.70 Meanwhile, unlike the situation in cases where this issue has not been raised 
much less decided, the courts should refuse to treat the provisions of the Bulletin as 
though they were properly promulgated under the APA. Until such time as the PTO 
properly promulgates its requirements, any statement in its Bulletin should carry no 
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more weight than if it were in an OED decision 71 or a Solicitor's brief. That is, it 
should be judged on the quality of its reasoning. Much of the contents of the Bulletin, 
in contrast, comprise criteria without any justification or reasoning whatsoever. An 
example is the inclusion of computer engineering but not computer science. For that 





See supra note * regarding a decision that rejects a similar argument. 
62.
 Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d. 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
63.
 See In re Doe, supra note 39. 
64.
 Jerri's Ceramic Arts, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 874 F.2d 205, 
207-08 (4th Cir. 1989). 
65.
 See supra note 28. 
66.
 See supra, at note 41. See also, e.g., the account of amendments to Part 10 
discussed in In re Teicher, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573 (Comm'r 1989). 
67.
 See infra Appendix, particularly italicized language in the second paragraph of 
Discussion and in the Commissioner's response. 
68.
 See supra, at note 56. 
69.
 Compare Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1677 (1991). That 
case is easily distinguished but raises a potentially troublesome problem of standing. 
Still, it is difficult to imagine that only prospective practitioners would have standing 
in this instance given the lack of restriction in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553(d) or 5 U.S.C. Sec. 
553 generally. 
70.
 See infra Appendix. 
71.
 Generating rules through decisions seems to be the only acceptable (and even then 
not without criticism) alternative to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553 for promulgating substantive 
rules of binding effect. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Wyman-Gordon 
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Explanation regarding the appendix. What follows is the text and Discussion of 
Resolution 701-1 of the American Bar Association, Section of Patent, Trademark and 
Copyright Law, Subcommittee on Software Patent Protection to the Computer Law 
Committee. The resolution is indicated to have passed 54-2, but the date does not 
appear. 
A Westlaw search did not indicate further action by the Subcommittee. 
This substantially abbreviated material, with emphasis added both in the Discussion 
and in the quotation from Commissioner Quigg, is reprinted from DAVID BENDER, 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOFTWARE PATENTS, Appendix 2 (PLI 1990). 
RESOLVED, that the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law supports in 
principle the amendment of the requirements for being hired as a patent examiner and 
for admission to the examination for registration as a patent attorney to permit the 
hiring of patent examiners and the admission of patent attorneys with bachelor's 
degrees or the equivalent in computer science. 
Past Action. None. 
Discussion 
Recently, concern has been mounting that the... Office is incapable of adequately 
handling software patent applications because patent examiners have insufficient 
training with respect to computer software and related mathematics. Some people have 
argued that a solution for this problem may be to establish an institute... wherein new 
hires would be trained in computer software by private sector experts. The... Office is 
actively investigating this possibility. 
The Committee agrees that most examiners are inadequately trained in computer 
software, but disagrees with the proposed solution.... The simple reason why patent 
examiners have inadequate computer software training is that the rules for admission 
to the patent bar, which are the same as the rules for qualification as a patent 
examiner, have not been updated to permit admission of attorneys who have 
undergraduate degrees in computer science.... 
As of July 5, 1989, the chairman of this subcommittee wrote a letter to Donald J. 
Quigg,... then Commissioner... advocating that the rules for admission to the patent bar 
be amended to permit admission of attorneys with computer science degrees. This 
letter indicated that there has been a recent explosion of patents being issued 
referencing Class 364, Subclass 3, which includes software systems (programs) used in 
programmable digital data processing systems or computers for operators upon digital 
data. It further recited the statistic that [w]hile the total number of new patents granted 
per year have increased by 37% between 1978 and 1987, the number of software 
patents granted per year has increased by 470% over the same period.... It additionally 
related that the chairman of this subcommittee had privately discussed this matter with 
a highly placed member of the examining staff, who indicated recognition of the 
problem and agreement with the solution proposed.... 
The former Commissioner... responded... on July 11, 1989, and stated...: 
I appreciate your advocacy for changing the registration requirements to 
permit admission for attorneys with undergraduate degrees in computer 
science. However, no change in the registration requirements is 
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contemplated at this time. The scientific and technical training 
qualification requirements for registration as a patent attorney or agent 
are the same as the qualifications for being hired as a patent examiner. 
Both patent examiners and registered practitioners must deal with and 
understand the same subject matter in patent applications and their 
communications. Thus, ability to do so would appear to involve similar 
education and training. Clearly, it is appropriate and reasonable that a 
person seeking registration under 37 CFR 10.6 have comparable 
training to a patent examiner.
This response somewhat missed the point, in one sense, and yet in another sense it 
actually supports the breadth of the proposed resolution. It is not a justification for the 
current rules concerning attorney admission to the patent bar that the rules concerning 
qualifications to be a patent examiner are the same, or vice versa. The rules should be 
updated in both instances. It would, in the Committee's view, be a waste of time and 
expense to create an institute to train patent examiners lacking an educational 
background in computer software and related mathematics. The simple and direct 
solution to the problem... is to update the rules to permit the hiring of patent examiners 
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